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Beyond Toleration: Queer Theory and Heteronormativity 
 
Declan Kavanagh  





The recent widespread transformation in the conjugal rights of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and 
Transgender (LGBT) people across much of the globe may seem to suggest that, at long last, the 
history of heterosexism has reached its terminus. In Ireland, the Equal Marriage Referendum in May 
2015 offered the opportunity for the citizens of the Republic to extend the same rights, permissions, 
and privileges to same-sex couples that married heterosexual couples freely enjoy. The passing of that 
referendum and the extension of these rights to same-sex couples denotes a move beyond societal 
toleration toward societal acceptance, yet it remains to be seen whether or not the affordance of 
conjugal rights to LGBT people will necessarily mean that all queer subjects will be given the same 
acceptance.  
This article examines equal marriage and its potential engendering of binary divisions 
between queer subjects who adhere to the logic of cultural heteronormativity and those who transgress 
its structuring forces. It aims to historicise the discourse that surrounds gay marriage by tracing these 
debates back to the Enlightenment's production of the companionate marriage. The works of Edmund 
Burke, his aesthetic writings and political speeches, provide the textual basis for an examination of 
'normative desire' in the eighteenth century. The article contends that assessing the eighteenth 
century's regime of heteronormativity will allow us to see the provisional nature of our own 






Over the past decade or so, we have witnessed a widespread transformation in the conjugal, 
and potentially, other civil rights of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) people 
across much of the Western world. As Ana de Freitas Boe and Abby Coykendall note in the 
introduction to their seminal collection Heteronormativity in Eighteenth-Century Literature 
and Culture (2014), this transformation may seem like an auspicious sign that the regime of 
heterosexism is drawing to a close in the West.
1
 In 2013, Queen Elizabeth II granted royal 
assent to the Marriage Act of the British Parliament, thereby sanctioning same-sex marriage 
in England as well as Wales. Most recently, the Irish people passed equal marriage by 
popular vote in a referendum on marriage held in May 2015; while just a few weeks later, the 
United StatesÕ Supreme Court followed by ruling that same-sex marriage was now legal in all 
fifty states. This move towards marriage equality began over a decade earlier, outside of both 
the United Kingdom and the United States, when first the Netherlands (2001), then Canada 
and Belgium (2003), and finally Spain (2005), South Africa (2006), New Zealand (2012), 
France (2013) and nearly a dozen South American and European countries took successive 
turns legalising same-sex marriage.
2
  
The aim of this article is to go some way to offer a queer-literary-historical context for 
this move toward marriage equality. Broadly speaking, the articleÕs methodological approach 
is a blend of literary historicism and queer theory, and the archive in focus is British 
                                                
1
Ana de Freitas Boe and Abby Coykendall, ÔIntroductionÕ in Heteronormativity in Eighteenth-Century 
Literature and Culture (London: Ashgate, 2014), p. 1. 
2
 Ibid.  
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Enlightenment literature. Chiefly, in tracing the development of LGBT politics toward its 
telos of marriage, the argument that follows is concerned with a re-tracing or, rather a tracing 
back. In particular, the work of that eighteenth-century Irish man of letters, Edmund Burke 
(1729-1797), namely his philosophical treatise, A Philosophical Inquiry Into the Origin of 
Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful (1757), and some parliamentary speeches. Queer 
theory is a particularly illuminating, if albeit unlikely, lens through which to view BurkeÕs 
aesthetic theory. Irish Feminist and psychoanalytic critic, Noreen Giffney, defines queer 
theory as: 
 
denot[ing] a collection of methods all devoted to examining desire and its 
relationship to identity. Queer theorists interrogate the categorization of 
desiring subjects (that is, the creation of identities based on desire), while 
making visible the ways in which some desires (and thus identities) are made 




Queer theory, then, interrogates the formation of desiring subjects along the fault line of the 
binary between normative, or heteronormative, cross-sex desiring subjects and supposedly 
non-normative same-sex desiring subjects. In blending queer theory with literary and 
aesthetic histories, my aim is to historicise some of the vocabulary that emerged during the 
Equal Marriage Irish referendum debates. In sum, this article addresses the ahistorical nature 
of much of the discourse surrounding the Equal Marriage referendum in Ireland in May, and 
the United StatesÕ Supreme CourtÕs ruling in June 2015.  
By ahistorical, I mean the way in which certain terms are invoked as if the signified of 
the signifier - of the term Ð exists in a vacuum. An obvious and recurrent example of this 
discursive ahistoricism is the use of the very word marriage. So called Marriage defenders 
and reformers alike tend to premise debates upon the casually anachronistic phantasm of the 
Ôtraditional marriageÕ, otherwise known as the bourgeois companionate marriage, drawing 
upon that single formulation of matrimony as the sole incarnation of matrimony, irrespective 
of historical period or cultural context. Yet, as de Freitas Boe and Coykendall have shown, 
companionate marriage was itself initially denounced as a Ôscandalous contravention of 
custom, the regulated and promulgated at the behest of the state during the eighteenth 
centuryÕ.
4
 The 1753 Marriage Act, through which the British Parliament set the conditions for 
consensual heterosexual marriages, was itself initially thought to be an unacceptable 
redefinition of the very terms of marriage.
5
 
It is no mistake that the companionate marriage Ñ the most heteronormative of 
institutions Ñ was engendered during the Enlightenment, as it was during the long eighteenth 
century that the rise of a large scale print culture helped to circulate and sustain Anglo-
European configurations of the sex/gender system through novels, newspapers, educational 
tracts, fashion magazines, philosophical treatises, declarations of rights, and numerous other 
mass-reproduced texts of the period. In complex ways, the Enlightenment has bequeathed to 
us our modern regime of the heteronormative and, this article contends that a queer critical 
                                                
3
 Noreen Giffney, ÔQuare TheoryÕ, in Irish Postmodernisms and Popular Culture, Wanda Balzano, Anne 
Mulhall and Moynagh Sullivan (ed.), (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 200.  
4
 de Freitas Boe and Coykendall, p. 2.  
5
 The 1753 Hardwick Marriage Act prompted much controversy. The Thelyphthora controversy arose when 
Martin Madan attacked the Act, and in doing so, constructed a defence of polygamy. For Madan, polygamy is a 
serious solution to an epidemic of seduction and female ruin caused by false or bad marriages. See Felicity 
Nussbaum, ÔThe Other WomanÕ, in Margo Hendricks and Patricia Parker (ed.) Woman, ÔRaceÕ and Writing in 
the Early Modern Period (London and New York: Routledge, 1994),  
p. 147; Conrad Brunstrm, William Cowper: Religion, Satire, Society (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 
2004), pp. 85-86.   
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return to the texts of that period allows us to assess current norms, which, in any case, should 
not be privileged as stable but remembered instead as provisional and shifting. In what 
follows, we will first examine the historicity of ÔhomosexualityÕ- its historical development 
within an Irish context - before attending to the vexed ways in which Enlightenment texts 
attempt to uphold and perform heteronorms. For the purposes of this, I will examine two texts 
by Edmund Burke: the first, his 1757 A Philosophical Inquiry Into the Origin of Our Ideas of 
the Sublime and Beautiful; the second, the text of a speech, which Burke delivered to 
parliament in 1780 on the topic of the brutal mob murder of two pilloried sodomites. In 
examining these diverse texts Ð one philosophical, the other rhetorical Ð we can trace how the 
EnlightenmentÕs heteronorms, insecure as they were, provide us with a basis for 
reconsidering, and, indeed, reconceiving, our own current formulations. 
 
Love and Marriage: Historicising Homo and Hetero-normativities 
 
Heteronormativity, as a term, requires some parsing. Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner, the 
first theorists to deploy the term, define heteronormativity as: Ôinstitutions, structures of 
understanding, and practical orientations that make heterosexuality seem not only coherent Ñ 
that is organized as a sexuality Ñ but also privilegedÕ.
6
 Hetero norms are not reducible to 
hetero sex acts. As de Freitas Boe and Coykendall state, unlike the term Ôheterosexuality, 
which refers to the erotization of mutually exclusive yet attracted male-female sex partners, 
the term heteronormativity comprehends the entire array of polarised taxonomies that 
organise compulsory heterosexuality and generate its aura of obviousnessÕ.
7
 Furthermore, 
heteronormativity inflects judicial, medical, historical, sociological, and other cultural 
discourses so thoroughly that any intentional intervention in their everday workings is almost 
needless to bolster and perpetuate it.
8
 Everday examples of heteronormativity are easily 
drawn upon; BerlantÕs and WarnerÕs well-known example of campaining for president in the 
United States is a case in point. The office of the President of the United States of America is 
an office that is clearly heterosexualised with its inbuilt narrative expectation of a cis-
gendered male President and cis-gendered female First Lady. From the sublime to the 
ridculous, we could also mention the well-documented experience of booking 
accommodation as a same-sex couple in the West, when, more often than not, the hotelÕs 
default position is to provide a twin bed room instead of a double bed room; as if two men or 
two women could not possibly wish to share the same bed; as if LGBT people never travel, or 
at the very least, as if they never travel together. As de Freitas Boe and Coykendall suggest: 
 
the ÔheteroÕ of heteronormativity sets the conditions for who does Ñ or who 
does not Ñ signify as normally and rightfully human by producing and 
policing three interwoven categories of difference: sex (dichotomous 
male/female embodiment), gender (asymmetrically socialized roles, 
characteristics, or behaviours), and sexuality (the expectation, even 





It is important to recognise how these interwoven sets of conditions serve to define the 
heterornormative; we might note how marriage is a core part of heteronormativity; we might 
                                                
6
 Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner, ÔSex in PublicÕ, Critical Inquiry, Vol. 24, No. 2, Intimacy (Winter, 1998), 
p. 547.  
7






ask then how will equal marriage, the extension of the rights and privileges afforded to 
heterosexual couples in marriage to LGBT couples, revise, or renew, this heteronormative 
expectation? Some might say that the inclusion of those LGBT people who decide to marry 
into the conjugal fold will weaken the institution of marriage, yet, the mystique of marriage 
had been diminishing quickly long before the affording of legal status to same-sex marriage. 
For decades, the upsurge in elective singlehood, in protracted, serial, asexual, or polyamorous 
cohabitation, in divorce, in unmarried couples, or in non-biological, extramarital models of 
kinship have all done much to demonstrate alternative couplings or ways of living. We might 
even say that the opening up of marriage to LGBT people will do much to refresh the 
institutionÕs mystique.  
  Even at the germinal point of traditional marriage, or companionate marriage in the 
eighteenth century, most people, as Susan S. Lanser has shown, lived outside of Ôheterosexual 
dyads, unwittingly or wittingly transgressed heteronormative rubricsÉÕ
10
. As this article 
explores, Edmund BurkeÕs Philosophical Enquiry bears out this anxiety of Enlightenment 
hetero-normalization of desire; in other words, it attempts to heterosex subjects into the 
binary of desiring and gazing male subject, and its corollary of an objectified and stationary 
female subject. When discussing Enlightenment sexuality, we must be careful to consider 
anachronism. In the following oft-quoted passage, taken from The Will to Knowledge: The 
History of Sexuality, Vol. 1 (1976), Michel Foucault historically locates the emergence of the 
category of the ÔhomosexualÕ in the West in the 1870s: 
 
As defined by the ancient civil or canonical codes, sodomy was a category of 
forbidden acts; their perpetrator was nothing more than the juridical subject 
of them. The nineteenth-century homosexual became a personage, a past, a 
case history, and a childhood, in addition to being a type of life, a life form, 
and a morphology, with an indiscreet anatomy and possibly a mysterious 
physiology. Nothing that went into his total composition was unaffected by 
his sexuality. It was everywhere present in him: at the root of all his actions 
because it was their insidious and indefinitely active principle; [É] 
Homosexuality appeared as one of the forms of sexuality when it was 
transposed from the practice of sodomy onto a kind of interior androgyny, a 
hermaphrodism of the soul. The sodomite had been a temporary aberration; 




Advancing a debate that is now axiomatic in the field of the history of sexuality, Foucault 
argues that the contemporary notion of homosexuality is the product of a number of 
nineteenth-century institutional and discursive constructions such as psychology, sexology, 
education, law and medicine, as opposed to the Early Modern condition of a single discursive 
domain of the juridical. From the sodomitical, a category that figured a range of sexual and 
social transgressions emerged the homosexual as a species. Indeed, FoucaultÕs argument is a 
foundational one for queer historical enquiry. The Foucaultian project demonstrates the 
cultural and historical contingency of all sexual identities Ð including heterosexuality. 
As Alan Sinfield theorises, ÔgayÕ as a term is historically specific and therefore unique 
in how it is currently.
12
 The identity of ÔgayÕ or ÔhomosexualÕ was not available in the 
                                                
10
 Ibid., p. 9. 
11
 Michel Foucault, The Will To Knowledge: The History of Sexuality Volume 1, Robert Hurley, trans.  (London: 
Penguin Books, 1998), p. 43. 
12
 Alan Sinfield, Gay and after (London: SerpentÕs Tail, 1998), p. 13.  
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eighteenth-century, and, curiously, as such, the absence of such coherence meant that 
heteronormativity must work harder against a range of transgressive figures Ð the molly, the 
fop, the Sapphic dame Ð to ensure its own stability.  
 
Enlightenment Sex and its Aesthetics of the Normal 
 
Edmund BurkeÕs Inquiry typifies the circular logic of heteronormativity as it emerged during 
the eighteenth century. Notably, the philosophical treatise emerged at a time when many civic 
commentators were energetically establishing connections between luxury, effeminacy and 
national degeneration in their diagnoses of an enervated body politic. Rather than celebrating 
ÔmanlyÕ behaviour, the theatre of the Seven YearsÕ War (1756-1763) frequently cast back a 
distorted image of an incompetent elite officer class. The narrative of Admiral John Byng 
(1704-1757), who was court-martialled and executed for his failure to secure the trading post 
of Minorca against the French in May 1756, presents an episodic example of how imperial 
anxieties became condensed into broader fears over manliness and its antithesis, effeminacy. 
Foppish effigies of Byng were burned in symbolic executions throughout the country, 
rehearsing the belief that ByngÕs unmanliness had precipitated MinorcaÕs fall. The phobic 
lampooning of generals for their unmanly failures functioned, with varying levels of success, 




It is within this particularly charged social context, fraught with gender and sexual 
panic that we should read BurkeÕs explication of the desiring subject in the Enquiry. For 
example, a careful reading of BurkeÕs aesthetic treatise betrays his anxiety over how to 
account for male beauty. Whilst beauty is eventually embodied in woman, for much of the 
treatise the category of beauty actually remains queerly un-gendered.
14
 While there are 
difficulties with reading a straightforward gendered dichotomy in A Philosophical Enquiry, it 
is nonetheless clear that a process of gendering is operative throughout the treatise. Building 
on Alexander PopeÕs figuring of lust as the basis of society in Epistle III of An Essay on Man 
(121-135), Burke writes: 
 
The passion which belongs to generation, merely as such, is lust only; this is 
evident in brutes, whose passions are more un-mixed, and which pursue their 
purposes more directly than ours. The only distinction they observe with 
regard to their mates, is that of sex. It is true, that they stick severally to their 
own species in preference to all others. But this preference, I imagine, does 
not arise from any sense of beauty which they find in their species [É] But 
man, who is a creature adapted to a greater variety and intricacy of relation, 
connects, with the general passion, the idea of some social qualities, which 
direct and heighten the appetite which he has in common with all other 
animals; and he is not designed like them to live at large, it is fit that he 
should have something to create a preference, and fix his choice; and this in 
general should be some sensible quality; as no other can so quickly, so 
                                                
13
 Katherine Wilson makes the point that some extra-parliamentary campaigns intensified their attacks on the 
Government as a result of its attempt to foist blame onto figures like Byng. See Wilson, The Sense of the People 
Politics, Culture and Imperialism in England, 1715- 1785 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 
181. 
14
 Ana De Freitas Boe, ÔNeither Is It at All BecomingÕ: Edmund BurkeÕs A Philosophic Enquiry, the Beautiful, 
and the Disciplining of DesireÓ, Queer People V, Cambridge United Kingdom, July 2008 (unpublished 
conference paper).  
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powerfully, or so surely produce its effect. The object therefore of this mixed 
passion which we call love, is the beauty of the sex. Men are carried to the 
sex in general, as it is the sex, and by the common law of nature; but they are 
attached to particulars by personal beauty.
15
   
 
While brutes only adhere to distinctions of sex and species, the social, or what Burke terms 
manÕs Ôintricacy of relationÕ, works on the affect of beauty, which Òconnects with the general 
passionÓ some Ôsocial qualitiesÕ that serve to Ôdirect and heightenÕ the sexual appetite that is 
common to both man and animal.
16
 Men are Ôcarried to the sex [women]Õ because of the 
Ôcommon law of natureÕ, and it is an attraction to the particulars of Ôpersonal beautyÕ that 
helps them to fix their social-sexual choice.
17
  
Contrary to PopeÕs assertion that ÔReflection, Reason, still the ties improveÕ (Essay on 
Man, III, 133) ÔReasonÕ seemingly does not have a formative part in BurkeÕs heterosocial 
order. As we are told, this social ordering of the sexes is pre-rational and based on the 
Ôcommon law of natureÕ, which is analogous to the foundation of Ônatural pleasuresÕ referred 
to in the ÔIntroduction on TasteÕ. Yet, Reason does guide men in the self-management of their 
erotic impulses. Burke makes clear that the frustration of the pleasures of the society of the 
sexes, the gratification of heteroerotic desire, causes no Ôgreat painÕ, that the Ôabsence of 
[this] pleasure [is] not attended with any considerable painÕ.
18
 Moreover, men are Ôguided by 
reason in the time and manner of indulging themÕ.
19
 Whereas brutes obey ÔlawsÕ, natural 
laws, which condition their ÔinclinationÕ to emerge during Ôstated seasonsÕ, it is through the 
operation of the reasoning faculty that men, and men alone, direct their own pleasures. 
Extending on PopeÕs elevation of ÔReason É oÕer InstinctÕ, Burke foregrounds how pleasure 
is always within manÕs control.
20
 MankindÕs ability to exercise Reason as a self-controlling 
mechanism prevents over-indulgence in the Ôpleasures of loveÕ.
21
 In this way, Reason ensures 
that the effeminacy brought about by an over-active heterosexual appetite is avoided. What is 
emphasised is pleasure, and in particular, hetero pleasure, in and of itself.  
Yet, Burke must do further work to close down the queer potential of the spectatorÕs 
desire for the beautiful man. Whereas personal beauty encourages men towards individual 
women, beauty is more capaciously conceived of as: 
 
A social quality; for where women and men, and not only they, but when 
other animals give us a sense of joy and pleasure in beholding them, (and 
there are many that do that) they inspire us with sentiments of tenderness and 
affection towards their persons; we like to have them near us, and we enter 
willingly into a kind of relation with them, unless we should have strong 




Crucially then, beauty is first introduced as a Ôsocial qualityÕ that is not limited to the cross-
sex gaze. Not only women, but also men, children and animals can excite ÔloveÕ, which 
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 Ibid., p. 39. 
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causes feelings of tenderness and affection.
23
 Having outlined how beauty is a socialising 
force in the first part of the Enquiry, Burke then spends much of the third part limiting the 
erotic pleasure of the beautiful to the bodies of women. While men may excite the ÔloveÕ of 
other men, this ÔloveÕ is somehow always emptied of erotic feeling: 
 
We shall have a strong desire for a woman of no remarkable beauty; whilst 
the greatest beauty in men, or in other animals, though it causes love, yet 
excites nothing at all of desire. Which shews that beauty, and the passion 
caused by beauty, which I call love, is different from desire, though desire 




Whilst beauty is grounded as a property of certain bodies, which causes Ôlove, or some 
passion similar to itÕ, Burke ensures that only female bodies excite a love that is mixed with 
desire.
25
 While this may seem like an unremarkable, and indeed, unavoidable qualification, it 
nonetheless determines BurkeÕs vision of social order as heteronormative. Importantly, 
keeping social order largely independent of procreative instinct ensures that heterosexuality 
itself is not entirely reducible to its procreative function. More intriguingly, BurkeÕs entire 
reading of beauty in the third part of the Enquiry rests on disinvesting male beauty of desire. 
If utility, proportion, or fitness determined beauty then the male body would be Ômuch more 
lovely than women; and strength and agility would be considered as the only beautiesÕ.
26
  
BurkeÕs discussion of deformity is particularly interesting when read in dialogue with 
David HumeÕs comments on beauty in his ÔOf the Standard of TasteÕ. For Hume, beauty 
exists only in the mind and cannot be assessed as a Ôquality in things themselvesÕ. Hume 
writes that: 
 
Beauty is no quality in things themselves: it exists merely in the mind which 
contemplates them; and each mind perceives a different beauty. One person 
may perceive deformity, where another is sensible of beauty; and every 




In contrast to HumeÕs libertarian aesthetic, Burke argues that deformity is not the opposite of 
beauty but of: Ôcompleat, common formÕ.
28
 Rather than allow individual sentiments free 
range, the import of BurkeÕs discussion of deformity demonstrates a clear divide between the 
positive pleasure of beauty and its absolute opposite: ÔuglinessÕ.
29
 Between the beautiful and 
the ugly exists: a Ôsort of mediocrity, in which the assigned proportions are most commonly 
found, but this has no effect upon the passionsÕ.
30
 This grey area between beauty and ugliness 
ensures that when confronted with beauty, our passions are uniformly moved. In contrast to 
Hume then, Burke advances a concept of beauty as both grounded in bodies and uniformly 




 Ibid,, p. 83. 
25
 Ibid., p. 106.  
26
 Ibid., p. 96. 
27
 David Hume, Four dissertations. I. The natural history of religion. II. Of the passions. III. Of tragedy. IV. Of 
the standard of taste (London: printed for A. Millar, in the Strand, MDCCCVII. [1757]), p. 209. 
28
 Burke, A Philosophical, p. 93. 
29




affective: Ôbeauty is for the greater part, some quality in bodies, acting mechanically upon the 
human mind by the intervention of the sensesÕ.
31
 
Rather than read the Enquiry as simply presenting a gendered apartheid, we should 
acknowledge how BurkeÕs delineation of the sublime and beautiful contributes to complex 
and interrelated discursive processes of heterosexualising Enlightenment pleasures. Part 
Three of the Enquiry culminates in the grounding of erotic beauty in the bodies of women. In 
arguing that ÔperfectionÕ is not the cause of ÔbeautyÕ, Burke supports the claim with the 
observation that women: Ôlearn to lisp, to totter in their walk, to counterfeit weakness, and 
even sicknessÕ in a performative effort to appear more feminine, and ultimately more 
desirable.
32
 Beauty in distress is Ôthe most affectingÕ, and aware that beauty involves 
weakness or imperfection, women, as Ôguided by natureÕ regulate their behaviour 
accordingly.
33
 In this way, performed delicacy or weakness is what constitutes a beautiful 
female body. We know that this weakness is, indeed, performed because Burke clearly states 
that any real weakness, such as that which arises from ill health, has no Ôshare in beautyÕ.
34
 In 
delineating a range of recognisably feminine behaviours, Burke is in many ways theorising 
what Judith Butler terms Ôintelligible gendersÕ.
35
 Rather than presenting the beautiful as 
feminine, BurkeÕs deconstruction of the beautiful says more about his awareness of the 
socially constructed basis of both gender and the gendered structuring of desire. We might 
then say that at the core of heteronormativityÕs construction we find its potential de-
construction. 
Indeed, a recurring tension evident throughout the Enquiry involves the discussion of 
beauty as both learned behaviour and an inherent property of bodies. The serpentine ÔSÕ line, 
identified by Hogarth in The Analysis of Beauty as Ôthat [which] leads the eye a wanton kind 
of chaceÕ and that gives pleasure, is found in the Enquiry in the curve of a womanÕs neck and 
in the swell of her breast.
36
 While in agreement with HogarthÕs line of beauty S, Burke 
queries the idea that this particular line is always to be found in Ôthe most completely 
beautifulÕ.
37
 Burke, as Ronald Paulson notes, Ôdissociates himself from HogarthÕs 
epistemology of pursuit (AddisonÕs Novel)Õ.
38
 In Chapter V of HogarthÕs Analysis, it is 
literally the hair on a womanÕs head that is most arousing: ÔThe most amiable in itself is the 
flowing curl; and the many waving and contrasted turns of naturally intermingling locks 
ravish the eye with the pleasure of the pursuit, especially when they are put in motion by a 
gentle breezeÕ.
39
 While still describing the beautiful in terms of variety, the idea of pursuit is 
curiously understated, if at all present, in BurkeÕs version of female beauty. Unlike the 
tousled hair of HogarthÕs passing women, the woman in the Enquiry is observed in a much 
more intimate and stationary relation to the male spectator: 
 
Observe that part of a beautiful woman where she is perhaps the most 
beautiful, about the neck and breasts; the smoothness; the softness; the easy 
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 Ibid. p. 106. 
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 Gender for Judith Butler amounts to Ôthe repeated stylization of the body, a set of repeated acts [or behaviours 
that operate] within a highly rigid regulatory frame that congeal over time to produce the appearance of 
substance, of a natural sort of beingÕ. See Judith Butler. Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of 
Identity (New York: Routledge, 1990), pp. 45-46.  
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 William Hogarth, The Analysis of Beauty, Ronald Paulson, ed. (New Haven: Yale, 1997), p. 33.  
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 Burke, A Philosophical, p. 105. 
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 Hogarth, p. xlvii.  
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 Burke, A Philosophical, p. 34. 
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and insensible swell; the variety of the surface, which is never for the 
smallest space the same; the deceitful maze, through which the unsteady eye 
slides giddily, without knowing where to fix, or whither it is carried. Is not 
this a demonstration of that change of surface continual and yet hardly 
perceptible at any point which forms one of the great constituents of 
beauty?
40
   
 
The most intensely affective form of beauty then, for Burke, is engendered through the cross-
sex gaze, which excites love mixed with desire. Peter Cosgrove reads this passage as 
evidencing Ôa complex fear of matriarchal ruleÕ: ÔIt is not merely variation that arouses 
BurkeÕs anxieties but the simulation of power in an object too small to evoke the terror of the 
sublimeÕ.
41
 A reading of a womanÕs breasts as producing anxiety must be reconciled with the 
fact that an aim of the Enquiry is to show that, while clearly disorientating, beauty is 
ultimately a pleasurable experience. Moreover, Burke is quite clear that the power of an 
object is not dependent on its proportions, providing the example of the snake as a small 
creature that still produces feelings of terror. In contrast to William HogarthÕs flowing curls, 
the fluctuating line of beauty is, according to Burke: Ôa very insensible deviation [that] never 
varies É so quickly as to surprise, or by the sharpness of its angle to cause any twitching or 
convulsion of the optic nerveÕ.
42
 While not denying that the beautiful is powerful, it would 
seem that BurkeÕs unique and timely intervention in these debates is not to disarm the 
enervating force of the beautiful, nor render its transport less powerful, but curiously to 
intensify its emasculating power. What we find then in the Enquiry is a text, which attempts 
to heterosexualise the politics of the male gaze and the pleasure that the male gaze affords, 
but which, in doing so, unwittingly emphasizes the performative nature of all pleasures, as 
well as the power of female beauty to disorientate and to overwhelm for all of its supposed 
objectified passivity.  
 
Conclusion: Shaming the Sodomite / The Shame of Gay Tolerance 
 
In moving toward a conclusion, this article will refocus on a much later work in BurkeÕs 
career, that is, to look at the text of a speech that he delivered on the punishment of two men 
who had been convicted of sodomy. In April of 1780, Burke made a brave speech in 
parliament, which denounced the crowdÕs brutal murder of a plasterer, William Smith, who 
was being pilloried as punishment for Ôsodomitical practicesÕ.
43
 As Sally R. Munt argues, in 
addressing men who have been defined in legal terms as sodomites, Burke draws on the 
epistemological uncertainty that troubles all sodomitical representation.
44
 He argues that the 
punishment received by the man was in excess of the crime and its conviction, as the pillory 
was Ôa punishment of shame rather than of personal severityÕ.
45
 Burke deploys a description 
of the scene in order to evoke sympathy from his fellow parliamentarians: 
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The poor wretch hung rather than walked as the pillory turned around É he 
had deprecated the vengeance of the mob [É] he soon grew black in the 
face, and the blood forced itself out of his nostrils, his eyes, and his ears. 
That the officers seeing his situation, opened the pillory, and the poor wretch 
fell down dead on the stand of the instrument [É] The crime was however of 





As Munt suggests, BurkeÕs speech allows his fellow parliamentarians to imaginatively enter 
into the experience as a substitute for Smith.
47
 Rather than the brutality experienced by 
Smith, Burke advocates a tactic of shame. The crime is of an Òequivocal natureÓ and, by 
extension; the category of the sodomite is also unknown or unknowable. We could be 
tempted here to suggest that ÔshameÕ could register in BurkeÕs eighteenth-century parlance as 
near equivalent to our own definition of ÔtoleranceÕ, in so much as societyÕs contemporary 
toleration of the queer subject is animated by a kind of shame, which, in turn, perpetuates 
shaming practices. Yet if there is a lesson to be drawn from BurkeÕs unlikely and 
compassionate defence of the pilloried sodomites, it seems to be more to do with the 
reification of sexual minority identity Ð he is warning against pretending to know what is 
unknowable Ð what the sodomite actually signifies. His illumination of the mysteriousness of 
the sodomite anticipates Eve SedgwickÕs caveat about queer scholarship potentially 




In a sense, the passing of equal marriage may not signal the collapse of 
heteronormativity, but rather the affirmation of a competing homonormativity, with its 
corollary binary of good queers who marry and bad queers who do not. Should that unfold, it 
seems clear that heteronormativity, as a regime will have a renewed sense of who counts as 
legitimately human and who does not, who should be accepted and who should be tolerated, 
if at all.  If Enlightenment literature has anything to teach us about heteronormativity, it is 
that the process of normalisation itself invariably illuminates counter points to resist and to 
subvert its certain forces; in welcoming acceptance in our own time we must not do so at the 
risk of stigmatising queer subjects who desire different lives and different loves
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